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Abstract: In recent years geographic mental maps have made a comeback into the spotlight of scholarly inquiry in the area 
of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). While never disappearing completely from scholarly examination, geographic mental 
maps were side-lined in most geographic and international relations (IR) research agendas. While geographers had long 
acknowledged the importance of mental maps in the study of international politics, few studies centred on the influence of 
geographic cognition on foreign policy. Only with the cognitive revolution in IR did geographic mental maps find space to 
develop conceptually and empirically with regards to international politics. Beginning with Henrikson’s initial 
conceptualisation over three decades ago the mental map research agenda has adopted several different theoretical and 
methodological approaches which will be analysed in the current article. 
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In recent years geographic mental maps have made a 
comeback into the spotlight of scholarly inquiry in 
the area of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). The recent 
publication of several books entirely dedicated to the 
mental maps of an assortment of 20th-century policy-
makers (Akçali, 2009; Casey and Wright 2008; 2011; 
Thomas, forthcoming), along with the organisation of 
several dedicated conferences and panels, e.g., the 
international conference “Mental Maps of Early Cold 
War”, held at Oxford in September 2009, and the 
Third Global International Studies Conference, held 
in Porto in August 2011, have contributed to this 
trend.  
While never disappearing completely from 
scholarly examination, geographic mental maps were 
sidelined in most geographic and international 
relations research agendas. Newer, fresher and more 
provocative avenues of investigation were pursued. 
Many of the themes associated with mental maps 
were incorporated into other approaches, namely 
those of critical and post-structural geographies.  
There are several reasons for this phenomenon. 
The most important is certainly conceptual. As an 
analytical instrument for FPA, geographic mental 
maps continue to be an imprecise and 
underdeveloped concept (Criekemans, 2009; da 
Vinha, 2010; 2011a).  Despite the continuous clamour 
of the importance of the role of geographic mental 
maps on policy-making throughout most of the 20th-
century, very little theoretical development and 
empirical evidence was presented to endorse such 
claims. With the exception of a few ground-breaking 
studies treating foreign policy issues, the study of 
geographic mental maps evolved along very different 
trajectories, leaving explanations of inter-state 
relations for others theorists to explain. It was only in 
the 1980s that a systematic effort to “operationalise” 
the concept of mental maps in foreign policy analysis 
was undertaken, beginning with Alan Henrikson’s 
essay The Geographical “Mental Maps” of American 
Foreign Policy Makers (Criekmans, 2009; da Vinha, 
2011a; O´Loughlin and Grant, 1990). 
The ensuing decades have tenuously furthered 
this line of investigation, albeit with numerous 
theoretical and methodological approaches. As a 
result, it has proven difficult to identify the 
geographic mental map research agenda’s impact on 
international politics.  
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This review looks to systematise the research that 
is dispersed throughout the many different fields but 
with a primary focus on the role of geographic 
cognition on foreign policy-making. Accordingly, the 
review begins by assessing how the concept of mental 
maps originated and has evolved over time, 
evaluating the epistemological and methodological 
diversity. However, it is important to point out that 
research in these various fields of knowledge has 
grown so extensively over the years thereby requiring 
that our focus be necessarily limited. Therefore, the 
proceeding review is illustrative, not comprehensive. 
 
 
Finding a Bearing in a Conceptual Quagmire 
 
The man-milieu relation has been central to the 
discipline of geography since its beginning. As 
Reginald Golledge (2002: 2) affirms “understanding 
Human-Environment Relations has been a constant 
theme throughout the history of geography”. 
Nonetheless, the concept of environment has evolved 
considerably in the 20th-century implying different 
theoretical and methodological approaches to deal 
with the concepts variance. 
 
For much of that history “environment” largely referred 
to physical space (i.e., the tangible natural world). With 
increasing emphasis on the human side of this 
equation, “the environment” began to take on many 
new facets. Initially, the term was expanded to include 
the “built” environment (i.e., the tangible additions that 
humanity had made to the physical world). Then, in the 
latter part of the century, the term “environment” was 
expanded to include the behavioural environment (the 
environment of human interactions and movements), 
the socio-cultural environment (i.e., the hidden 
structures of customs, beliefs, and values that 
constrained human relations), the political 
environment (i.e., the human-defined boundaries, legal 
structures, an organizational structures within which 
human action takes place), and the cognitive 
environment (i.e., the internal representation of the 
world in our memories). (Golledge, 2002: 2) 
 
Accordingly, research on geographic mental maps 
has to be placed in this historical context of scientific 
fluidity and diversity. The concept has assumed many 
nomenclatures, and its scope and methods have 
changed through the years. To properly understand 
the concept it is necessary to appreciate the 
intellectual underpinnings of its formation and 
evolution.  
Accordingly, the first studies on mental maps and 
geographic perception and cognition can be traced 
back to the first half of the 20th-century. One of these 
studies dates back to Charles Trowbridge’s (1913) 
article On Fundamental Methods of Orientation and 
“Imaginary Maps”
1
. Gary Moore and Reginald 
Golledge (1976: 16), consider this to be the “first 
systematic experiment on human knowledge of the 
large-scale environment”. Nevertheless, the 
foundation of the modern study of mental maps is 
regularly attributed to Edward Tolman who coined 
the term “cognitive map” (Bell et al., 1996; Golledge 
and Stimson, 1997; Mark et al., 1999; Saarinen, 1987). 
By studying how rats learned to “map” the 
environment of experimental mazes, Tolman (1948) 
attempted to extrapolate his findings to human 
spatial orientation. After conducting various 
experiments with rats in order to demonstrate their 
capability of developing path learning skills from 
stimuli received from their surroundings, Tolman 
(idem) followed on by inquiring on “what are the 
conditions which favor narrow strip-maps and what 
are those which tend to favor broad comprehensive 
maps not only in rats but also in men?”. 
In the following years other studies regarding the 
cognition of geographic space were published but did 
not incite any particular scientific excitement (see 
Downs and Meyer, 1978; Mark et al., 1999; Moore and 
Golledge, 1976). However, it was with Kevin Lynch’s 
publication of The Image and the City in 1960 that 
there was a “widespread interest in understanding the 
formation and use of humans’ cognitive maps” (Bell 
et al., 1996: 81; see also Kitchin and Freundschuh, 
2002; Saarinen, 1987).  
As an urban planner Lynch sought to understand 
how people’s perception of their environment could 
assist planners in bettering urban planning and 
design. Through the use of sketch maps, Lynch 
looked to uncover city-dweller’s images of their cities 
– i.e., “the environmental image, the generalized 
mental picture of the exterior physical world that is 
held by an individual” (Lynch, 1960: 4). For Lynch the 
environmental image resulted from and interaction 
between the observer and his environment in which 
the latter suggests distinctions and relations, whereas 
the former “selects, organizes, and endows with 
meaning what he sees”
2
 (idem: 6). 
In fact, the interest in environmental cognition
3
 
had its defining moment in the 1960s (Downs and 
                                                          
1 According to Downs and Meyer (1978) it is difficult identify 
precisely the “firsts” in terms of scientific research. Although 
recognizing that Trowbridge “was awarded the honor of being the 
first to study geographical orientation and imaginary maps”, the 
authors (idem: 62) also acknowledge French psychologist Binet’s 
contribution to the theme of geographical orientation in the late 
Nineteenth Century.  
2 While each individual has his own image, Lynch argued that city 
planners were essentially interested in group images or “public 
images” (1960: 7). 
3 As referred to previously, the terminology regarding the cognition 
of geographical space is extremely varied. However in the period 
following the 1960s, the terms “environmental cognition”, 
“environmental knowing” and “environmental perception” were 
widely used in the thematic literature to describe “the study of the 
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Meyer, 1978; Moore and Golledge, 1976). The newly 
acquired interest in environmental cognition 
stretched across a wide array of disciplines, with fairly 
independent research agendas. Moore and Golledge 
(1976) identify five different lines of scientific inquiry 
during this period: urban planning, geography, 
anthropology, sociology, and psychology.  
In urban planning, as stated beforehand, Lynch 
“was perhaps the single most important influence on 
environmental cognition” (Moore and Golledge, 1976: 
17). His study on the environmental images of Boston, 
Jersey City, and Los Angles inspired a plethora of 
studies throughout the field of urban planning and is 
still today a reference for many urban designers 
throughout the world (LeGates and Stout, 1997). For 
its part, the anthropological dimension of 
environmental cognition focused on the comparison 
of cognitive systems on a cross-cultural level. 
Exemplary of this strand of cognitive anthropology is 
the study of “ethnosemantics” which focused on the 
relation between linguistic constructs and systems of 
meanings for organizing the world (Moore and 
Golledge, 1976). Sociologists approached 
environmental cognition from the perspective of 
“what people think and have thought about their 
cities” (idem: 20). The main work guiding sociological 
investigations into environmental cognition during 
this period was Anselm Strauss’s Images of the 
American City published in 1961. His research, 
followed by other sociologists, centred on 
understanding the “total, holistic fabric of the 
structure, function, and meaning of urban and 
nonurban environments” (idem: ibidem). 
According to Moore and Golledge (idem), 
psychology was the discipline that least contributed 
to individuals knowledge of large-scale environments. 
Albeit psychology’s considerable contribution to 
spatial cognition and perception in general (see Bell 
et al., 1996; Downs and Stea, 2005a; Kitchin and 
Freundschuh, 2002), it has been, contrary to other 
disciplines, “more concerned with the construction of 
overall, general, explanatory theories than any of 
these other fields” (Moore and Golledge, 1976: 20). 
Whilst some psychological studies focusing on 
large-scale environments were conducted during this 
period (see Moore and Golledge, 1976), it was in the 
field of geography that “work on environmental 
cognition has been most extensive” (idem: 17). The 
1960s witnessed a watershed in cognitive studies in 
                                                                                              
subjective information, images, impressions, and beliefs that 
people have of the environment, the way in which these 
conceptions arise from experience, and the ways in which they 
affect behavior with respect to the environment” (Moore and 
Golledge, 1976: 3). More precisely, environmental cognition refers 
to “the awareness, images, information, impressions, and beliefs 
that individuals have about the elemental, structural, functional, 
and symbolic aspects of real and imagined physical, social, cultural, 
economic, and political environments” (idem: 5). 
geography. According to Roger Downs and James 
Meyer (1978: 62) the works published in the 1940s 
and 1950s by geographers Gilbert White, John 
Wright, William Kirk, and James Watson “served as 
the essential basis for the work that dominated the 
1960s”. From outside the field of geography, Kenneth 
Boulding and Herbert Simon contributed 
considerably with their studies on images and the 
subjective nature of human behaviour to the 
enlargement of the behavioural approach to 
environmental issues (idem). 
These works, along with the growing 
dissatisfaction of geographers with the 
epistemological and ontological basis of logical 
positivism prevalent in geography at the time 
(Unwin, 1995; Wolpert, 1964), reinforced the growing 
attention given to behavioural theories
4
. Regardless 
of the intellectual storm swirling around the subject, 
there continued to be evidenced a lack of conceptual 
and theoretical consistency that stymied geographers’ 





Where to begin was perhaps the most disturbing 
problem that we faced. Even the most cursory reading 
of the literature within geography revealed that we 
could not survive for very long by taking in our own 
laundry. We were forced into the literature of other 
disciplines. Who would not admit to fruitless days spent 
lurking in the BF section of the Library of Congress 
classification, patiently reading through psychology 
texts and journals in search of anything with perception 
in the title. And who would not confess to the 
frustration and disappointment as studies of neural 
processes in the octopus and binocular parallax and 
Fechner’s Law revealed a terrible mistake. What “we” 
thought we meant by perception was not what “they” 
were talking about. (…) References to environment were 
equally disturbing; the environment for psychologists 
was a bizarre parody of what we were interested in. 
(Downs and Meyer, 1978: 64) 
 
The difficulties referred to above did not, 
however, entirely obliterate some logical consistency 
in approaching the cognition of geographic space. 
Specifically, in accordance with Downs and Meyer 
(idem; see also Golledge and Stimson, 1997) two basic 
streams of research evolved with distinct 
philosophical perspectives and methodologies – i.e., 
“empirical” and “humanistic” approaches
6
. The 
                                                          
4 For a more detailed description of the various factors leading to 
the emergence and development of behavioral geography see 
Golledge and Timmermans (1990: 57). 
5 Downs and Meyer (1978) refer to perceptual geography in their 
text, but their conceptualisation can today be placed in what has 
become generally designated as behavioural geography. 
6 Downs and Meyer (1978) partition these two distinct approaches 
further into a four-fold division. Accordingly, the humanist 
perspective could be divided into the “landscape school” (with its 
emphasis on affective relation between individuals and place) and 
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empirical perspective favoured a more formal 
scientific method, “emphasizing empirical 
observation, validation through public consensus and 
verification, and the separation of the subjective 
value from the objective fact” (Downs and Meyer, 
1978: 61). The humanistic approach, for its part, was 
interested in studying issues such as the individual’s 
values, meanings, purposes, and goals. Ultimately, 
the humanist sought to reveal the lived-world or 
Lebenswelt as the true field of human knowledge 
(idem).  
Nevertheless, the various scientific disciplines 
quickly began to converge, resulting in an 
increasingly multidisciplinary approach. As a result, 
the 1960s and 1970s witnessed a proliferation of 
studies covering a vast array of cross-disciplinary 
themes associated with geographic cognition. Along 
with the establishment of the Environment Design & 
Research Association (EDRA) and the foundation of 
the journal Environment and Behavior in the late 
1960s, the multidisciplinary approach supplied a 




Of the assortment of works published in this 
period, some are worth special mention due to their 
influence on the future of the geographic mental map 
research agenda, namely those dealing with large-
scale environmental cognition. Of particular 
relevance is Image and Environment, edited by Roger 
Downs and David Stea in 1973, which consisted of one 
of the first introductory publications outlining the 
scope and various approaches involved in cognitive 
map research (Saarinen, 1987). Downs and Stea 
(2005a: 1) recognized the lack of “theoretical effort per 
se … directed specifically to cognitive spatial 
representations”. Their primary purpose was to clarify 
concepts and put forward an initial theoretical and 
methodological base to be applied in future research 
on cognitive maps. 
Focusing heavily on psychology, the authors made 
pertinent observations as to the lack of a priori 
hypotheses, deficiency in measuring procedures, and 
terminological confusion (especially regarding 
perception and cognition
8
). Accordingly, the authors 
                                                                                              
“historical geography” (tracing the historical origins of 
geographical perceptions), whereas the empirical perspective was 
composed of by the “hazard perception” branch and the “cognitive 
mapping” branch (concerned with process from an empirical 
standpoint).  
7 For a comprehensive description of the various works dealing 
with the themes associated with the cognition of geographical 
space during this period see Golledge and Timmermans (1990) and 
also Moore (1979). 
8 The various studies dealing with mental maps has tended to use 
the terms “perception” and “cognition” in many different ways, 
usually confusing the two. In the present paper the term 
perception refers to “the process that occurs because of the 
presence of an object” (Downs and Stea, 2005b: 14), while cognition 
for its part “need not be linked with immediate behaviour and 
attempted to define the concept of “cognitive map”
9
 
along with their relation to spatial behaviour. Equally 
significant was the clarification between the concepts 
of cognition and perception, which were being 
employed in a confusing manner by researchers in all 
fields. In addition, the fundamental questions of the 
nature and functions of cognitive maps were explored 
in order to find the answers to the questions of “what 
people need to know?”, “what do people know?”, and 
“how do people get their knowledge?” (idem: 16). 
Another milestone work was Peter Gould and 
Rodney White’s Mental Maps (1974). Gould and 
White were fundamentally interested in identifying, 
by using space preference maps, the way in which 
distances between an individual and a specific place 
affects the image building process (idem). The 
underlying assumption held by the authors was 
essential to understanding spatial decision-making 
and behaviour: 
 
Human behavior is affected only by the portion of the 
environment that is actually perceived. We cannot 
absorb and retain the virtually infinite amount of 
information that impinges upon us daily. Rather, we 
devise perceptual filters that screen out most 
information in a highly selective fashion. (…) Our views 
of the world, and about people and places in it, are 
formed from a highly filtered set of impressions, and 
our images are strongly affected by the information we 
receive through our filters. This is why filter control is 
so crucial, both on a personal, individual basis and on a 
larger governmental scale. (Gould and White, 1974: 48) 
 
Many additional works analysing large-scale 
geographic cognition were published during this 
period and had a profound influence on geographic 
thinking underling the fact that the concept of a 
mental map or cognitive map was naturally inspiring 
and logical to geographers: 
 
Since behavior in space was seen to be the outcome of 
decision-making processes that rely on combining 
stored information with ongoing experience, the 
significance of the cognitive map as the mechanism for 
storing, recalling, and using such information was an 
appealing one and began to spread widely. (Golledge 
and Stimson, 1997: 225) 
                                                                                              
therefore need not be directly related to anything occurring in the 
proximate environment” (idem: ibidem). Accordingly, where 
perception is stimulus dependent, cognition concerns “more 
specific concepts and surrogates of sensation, perception, imagery, 
retention and recall, reasoning and problem solving, and the 
making of judgements and evaluations (i.e., decisions and choice)” 
(Golledge and Stimson, 1997: 191).  
9 Downs and Stea (2005b: 9) defined cognitive mapping as “a 
process composed of a series of psychological transformations by 
which an individual acquires, codes, stores, recalls, and decodes 
information about the relative locations and attributes of 
phenomena in his everyday spatial environment.”  
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In spite of the plethora of texts and the active 
research agenda, behavioural geography, particularly 
its study of cognitive and mental maps, diminished 
after the late 1970s (Golledge and Timmermans, 1990; 
Kitchin and Freundschuh, 2002). At the same time as 
alternative schools of thought were attracting 
geographers’ attention
10
, behavioural theory came 
under fierce disparagement from inside the discipline 
of geography. In addition to questioning the relevant 
contribution made to geographic knowledge
11
, critics 
also charged behavioural geography for its 
mechanistic and dehumanising approach and its 
failure in recognizing the broader social and cultural 
framework in which decision-making occurred 
(Kitchin and Blades, 2002; Kitchin and Freundschuh, 
2002; Unwin, 1995). 
The diminishing attention paid to behavioural 
theories and especially mental maps throughout the 
last couple of decades does not imply that all work on 
geographic cognition was refrained. On the contrary, 
various researchers pursued the cognitive agenda in 
the field of geography (see Downs and Stea, 2005a; 
Golledge, 2003; Golledge and Stimson, 1997; Kitchin 
and Blades, 2002; Kitchin and Freundschuh, 2002; 
Lloyd, 1982; 1989; Mark et al., 1999). Many theories 
and methods were developed and consolidated over 
the years, although there still does not exist a 
widespread consensus for dealing with the cognition 
of geographic space (Kitchin and Freundschuh, 2002). 
Moreover, humanist and qualitative perspectives 
have been integrated in order to improve the research 
agenda. As a result, behavioural geography at present 
“can be characterized by a concern both for scientific 
rigor or experimental realism and for 
phenomenological and anthropomorphic 
understanding of human-environment systems and 
relationships” (Golledge and Stimson, 1997: 29).  
Through the use of these varied approaches the 
research agenda has expanded to include a wide 
assortment of issues such as 1) studies of cognitive 
mapping and spatial behaviour; 2) attitudes, utility, 
choice, preference, search, and learning; 3) consumer 
behaviour; 4) location decision-making; 5) way-
finding, mode choice, and travel behaviour; 6) 
mobility and migration behaviour; 7) societal, 
materialist, or feminist interpretations of urban 
structure; 8) social reality of housing markets; 9) 
environmental ethics; 10) planning and policy-
making; 11) social problems of the homeless and other 
disadvantaged groups (idem). 
                                                          
10 The most attractive theories in the 1970s were the humanist 
theories with their phenomenological tradition, and the Marxist 
inspired radical theories (Claval, 2006; Unwin, 1995). 
11 For an extensive account of the debate between supporters and 
critics of the behavioral approach see Golledge and Timmermans 
(1990).  
Notwithstanding evolving interpretations 
regarding the significance and development of 
research on geographic cognition, most studies have 
tended to focus on scales that range from the micro 
space (space of the body) to the neighbourhood or 
city scale. Cognitive research of large-scale spaces, 
such as the global-scale, is infrequent. One of the 
principal reasons for the lack of research of large-
scale environments is due to their transperceptual 
dimension. This implies that large-scale spaces “are 
generally too large to be perceived all at once” and 
can only be experienced “by the integration of 
perceptual experiences over space and time through 
memory and reasoning, or through the use of small-
scale models such as maps (Mark et al., 1999: 748; see 
also Battersby and Montello, 2009). 
Some studies have devoted themselves to these 
larger geographic scales
12
. Most of these studies 
however tend to concentrate on very specific 
theoretical and methodological issues, applying 
intensive empirically-oriented approaches. More 
precisely, the majority of the contemporary research 
on large-scale geographic cognition is interested in 
the acquisition, representation and schematization, 
and communication of the information (Mark et al., 
1999). This information is of particular concern to 
researchers working on problems of navigation and 
orientation (Tversky, 2003). Studies on the 
distortions of acquired geographic information have 
been equally significant in recent years (Battersby 
and Montello, 2009).  
For the most part, however, studies of large-scale 
environments have avoided analysing the 
implications of mental maps in decision-making, 
especially in relation to international politics. While 
geographers such as Saarinen (2005: 148) had long 
pointed to the importance of mental maps in the 
study of international politics by stating that “it 
seems important in a world continually upset by 
international conflicts to try to gain an understanding 
of variation in world views”, this perspective went 
largely ignored for many years. Only with the 
cognitive revolution in IR did geographic mental 
maps find space to develop conceptually and 
empirically with regards to international politics. 
 
 
Geographic Mental Maps and the Cognitive 
Dimension in FPA 
 
The “rational actor” is one of the most well-
established concepts in International Relations 
                                                          
12 For a detailed account of the recent scientific research carried out 
on large-scale geographic space (global-scale) see Allen (1985), 
Battersby and Montello (2009), Golledge and Stimson (1997), Mark 
et al. (1999), and Montello (1998). 
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(Allison and Zelikow, 1999; Holsti, 2006; Hudson and 
Vore, 1995; Rosati, 2005). According to Rosati: 
 
Traditionally, foreign policy has been explained from a 
rational actor perspective common to the realist and 
power politics tradition. The assumption has been that 
governments, and their political leaders, think and act 
in a rational manner in their quest for power and order. 
Such rationality assumes that individuals perceive the 
world accurately and arrive at decisions through an 
open intellectual process: goals are ordered, a search is 
made for relevant information, a wide range of 
alternatives is considered, and the option that 
maximizes the benefits while minimizing the cost is 
selected. (Rosati, 2005: 50) 
 
Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War left rational 
explanations wanting. According to Valerie Hudson 
and Christopher Vore (1995), mainstream theories of 
IR were unable to predict the demise of the bi-polar 
confrontation and to explain the new complex 
international environment. In their critique of the 
time-honoured theories that dominated IR, especially 
rationally-centred explanations, Hudson and Vore 
(idem) insist that there is a lack of comprehension of 
human political choice. Specifically, the established 
theories failed to recognize that “with every system 
transformation … human will and imagination are 
major influences in shaping world affairs” (idem: 210). 
The alternative to the “rational” perspective came 
from the designated “cognitive revolution” (Hudson 
and Vore, 1995; Rosati, 2005). This approach has 
guided a vast array of research in IR that departed 
from the traditional theories, particularly by viewing 
human rationality as bounded. Accordingly, the 
cognitive approach is predisposed to examine the 
individuals involved in decision-making process and 
the complex environment in which they work: 
 
People sacrifice rather than optimize. They neither 
posses nor seek perfect information. They seem 
incapable of considering more than two or three 
alternatives at a given time. They process information in 
different ways under stress than under routine 
conditions. Furthermore, because any situation can be 
interpreted in a myriad of ways depending on the 
historical precedents used, the personalities and 
experiences of the individuals interpreting the situation 
and their social and cultural predispositions are 
important in making decisions. Hidden agendas, such 
as the need to maintain group consensus or the desire 
to protect or extend “turf” can undermine a rational 
cataloging of expected costs and benefits. Emotional 
and ideological motivations can similarly undercut a 
rational cost/benefit analysis. Moreover, the greater the 
number of people involved in a decision, the greater the 
complexity of the decision calculus. (Hudson and Vore, 
1995: 211) 
 
The last two and a half decades have seen a 
substantial growth in cognitive research in IR 
(Tetlock and McGuire, Jr., 1999). Nevertheless, while 
occupying a peripheral position in IR for many years, 
cognitive factors have long been recognized as vital to 
political decision-making (Holsti, 1976; 2006). The 
initial works clearly applying psychological concepts 
in political studies commenced in the 1930s and 
continued for the next several decades (Rosati, 2005). 
However, most of these early works were conducted 
by psychologists and had little impact on IR theorists. 
It was only in the 1950s that the “contribution of 
psychological approaches to the study of 
international relations grew in importance due to the 
interaction of the ‘peace research’ movement and the 
‘behavioral’ revolution in the social sciences” (idem: 
51). The IR theorists who adopted a decision-making 
approach to the study of foreign policy especially 
favored the psychological approach. 
One of the milestone studies was Foreign Policy 
Decision-Making, published by Richard Snyder et al., 
in 1962. Richard Snyder et al., study’s most important 
contribution to IR theory was identifying the human 
decision-maker as the key determinant of state 
behaviour. Though recognizing that the nation-state 
would continue to be the significant unit of political 
action for the foreseeable future, Snyder et al. (2002) 
centred the analysis on the decision-maker and his 
understanding of the situation: 
 
State action is the action taken by those acting in the 
name of the state. Hence, the state is its decision-
makers. State X as actor is translated into its decision-
makers as actors. It is also one of our basic choices to 
take as our prime analytical objective the re-creation of 
the “world” of the decision-makers as they view it. The 
manner in which they define situations becomes 
another way of saying how the state oriented to action 
and why. (Snyder et al., 2002: 59) 
 
Equally important to the development of the 
cognitive approach to foreign policy was the research 
carried on by Harold and Margaret Sprout (1957; 
1960; 1965). By focusing on the ecological perspective 
in foreign policy, the Sprouts (1957; 1965) looked to 
demonstrate how policies are related to the 
environment in which the political decisions were 
taken and carried out. In order to express the distinct 
cognitive dimensions in foreign policy, the Sprouts 
differentiated the psycho-milieu (the environment as 
is perceived and reacted to bay a particular 
individual) from the operational milieu (the 
environment in which the individual’s decision are 
executed). This distinction is fundamental to 
comprehend the complexity involved in foreign 
policy: 
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With respect to policy-making and the content of policy 
decisions, our position is that what matters is how the 
policy-maker imagines the milieu to be, not how it 
actually is. With respect to the operational results of 
decisions, what matters is how things are, not how the 
policy maker imagines them to be. (Sprout and Sprout, 
1957: 327-328) 
 
Along with a few other studies conducted during 
this period, this first generation of research in 
international politics contributed to the systematic 
study of the beliefs and images of foreign policy-
makers throughout the next generation of IR scholars 
(Rosati, 2005). Yet, it was Robert Jervis’s (1976) 
Perception and Misperception in International Politics 
that systematically incorporated for the first time 
psychological knowledge and international politics. 
For Jervis (idem: 4) “most psychological theories, and 
especially those that have been applied to 
international relations, do not account for the ways 
that highly intelligent people think about problems 
that are crucial to them”. As a result, in order to 
benefit from psychologies theoretical contributions, 
Jervis chose a broad and eclectic approach that 
employed diverse theories and experimental findings 
in psychology – e.g., attitude change, social 
psychology, cognitive psychology, and visual 
perception.  
Jervis’s work, along with John Steinburner’s The 
Cybernetic Theory of Decision (1974) reflected the 
“cognitive revolution” that swept psychology in the 
early 1970s. The major effect of this revolution was in 
changing the way the individual’s interaction with his 
environment was conceived. More precisely, the 
human being began to be understood as dynamic, 
rather than a passive agent – i.e., who selectively 
responded to and actively shaped his environment 
instead of passively responding to its stimuli (Rosati, 
1995). 
The ensuing years witnessed the development of a 
considerable amount of research that applied a wide 
variety of concepts, theoretical foundations, subjects, 
and “data-making” operations, making the cognitive 
approach to IR an eclectic research field (Holsti, 
2006). Nevertheless, by this time the different studies 
embodied most of the core assumptions that 




Tetlock and McGuire Jr. (1999) have identified two 
key assumptions at the core of the cognitive research 
agenda. The first states that the international 
environment is highly demanding in terms of 
information processing due to the complexity which 
results from incomplete and variable information. 
Also, decision-makers must many times operate 
                                                          
13 For a more detailed list of works see Holsti (2006); Hudson 
(2002); Rosati (2005); Tetlock and McGuire, Jr. (1999). 
under tremendous stress and pressure, limiting their 
capacity to choose utility-maximizing solutions. The 
second assumption asserts that due to decision-
maker’s limited information processing capabilities, 
they tend to employ simplifying schemes to deal with 
the immense complexity of the international 
environment. Accordingly, decision-makers construct 
simplified images of their political world in order to 
cope and come to a decision.  
From these key assumptions Tetlock and McGuire 
Jr. (1999: 506) proceed to identify the cognitive 
research program’s central research objective as the 
understanding of the “cognitive strategies that 
policymakers rely upon to construct and maintain 
their simplified images of the environment”. They 
further differentiate between two types of cognitive 
strategies.  
The first strategy corresponds to representational 
research, which relies on cognitive or knowledge 
structures that provide the framework for 
incorporating new informational inputs and choosing 
between the diverse policy options. These studies 
look to explain what policymakers think. This 
requires understanding their assumptions about 
themselves, other states, inter-state relationships, the 
goals and/or values underlying foreign policy, and the 
types of policies most helpful to achieving those goals 
or values. Some of the concepts most readily applied 
to describe these cognitive structures are “scripts”, 
“operational codes”, “cognitive maps”, “images”, 
“stereotypes”, “frames”, “prototypes”, and “schemas”. 
The second strategy acknowledged represents 
process research, with its principal focus on 
identifying the abstract laws of cognitive functioning 
that clarify how policymakers think about issues. The 
majority of this research looks to comprehend the 
rules and/or procedures that underlie the 
policymaking decision process. Some of the most 
significant lines of research in the process strategy are 
on the fundamental attribution error, extracting 
lesson from history, avoidance of value trade-offs, the 
policy-freezing effects of commitment, and crisis 
decision-making. As a result, in all these cases “the 
cognitive miser image of the decision maker serves as 
leitmotif: policymakers often seem unwilling or 
unable to perform the demanding information-
processing tasks required by normative models of 
judgment and choice” (Tetlock and McGuire Jr., 1999: 
511). 
Accordingly, it is in the context of the cognitive 
research agenda that geographic mental maps must 
be framed in FPA. The cognitive dimension of FPA 
opened up space for analysing geographic 
representations, namely foreign policy decision-
makers cognition of geographic space. 
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Geographic Mental Maps and the Study of 
Foreign Policy 
 
Despite the preliminary contribution of Harold and 
Margaret Sprout (1957; 1960; 1965) and of Snyder et al. 
(2002) in the 1950s and 1960s, it was Henrikson’s The 
Geographical “Mental Maps” of American Foreign 
Policy Makers, published in 1980, that first applied 
the “geographical mental map”
14
 as a conceptual 
instrument for foreign policy analysis
15
. 
Acknowledging that traditional political science has 
long been ill-equipped to deal with the geographic 
perceptions underlying foreign policy decisions, 
Henrikson argued that the mental map permits a 
better understanding of how individuals come to 
understand the spatial relationships involved in 
foreign policy-making: 
 
More important than knowing the names, locations, 
and sizes of countries is an awareness of the spatial 
processes we are caught up in. The matter of acquiring 
such a “geographic sense” is complex, even in technical 
terms. (…) Geography means much more than territory; 
even the meaning of the latter continually changes. (…) 
The mental-map approach to the study of international 
affairs is well suited to this increasingly fluid context. 
One of its major strengths is that it enables us 
immediately to recognize the vague and shifting 
character of the environments within which statesmen 
act. (Henrikson, 1980a: 504-505) 
 
With the intention of providing a functional 
framework for analytical purposes, Henrikson 
expanded the conceptual knowledge of geographic 
mental maps. Accordingly, he began by identifying 
the formational factors subjacent to mental maps – 
i.e., the maps cognitive base and a person’s world-
view (or Weltanschauung) – and proceeded to 
describe the appropriate methods for analysing an 
individual’s mental maps – the geographical mind and 
the geographical field. According to the author, 
examining the geographic mind, or “ideology” of the 
individual, can best be accomplished by making use 
of the methods of intellectual history and content 
analysis: 
 
The aim is, through a careful analysis of the language 
(visual as well as verbal) used in public speeches, 
diplomatic notes, treaty texts, cartographic annexes, 
                                                          
14 In a conceptualization close to that of Downs and Stea (2005b), 
Henrikson (1980a: 498) defines mental map as “an ordered but 
continually adapting structure of the mind – alternatively 
conceivable as a process – by reference to which a person acquires, 
codes, stores, recalls, reorganizes, and applies, in thought or 
action, information about his or her large-scale geographical 
environment, in part or in its entirety”. 
15 Henrikson (1975; 1980b) had previously analysed how geographic 
perceptions had influenced US foreign policy, especially through 
the analysis of different cartographical constructions. 
and the like, to determine the key geographical 
concepts and related images that…officials more or less 
consciously entertain in making, conducting, and 
justifying foreign policy. (Henrikson, 1980a: 509) 
 
Nevertheless, Henrikson insisted that it does not 
suffice to examine the ideological content of a 
decision-maker; “one must also have a reliable, nearly 
intuitive sense of the geographical milieu through 
which one moves” (idem: ibidem). This implies 
plotting the space in which an individual moves in 
carrying out his various occupational and social roles 
– i.e., the geographic field. By describing the actual 
life patterns of individuals (e.g., official travels), 
specifically by plotting the activity on cartographic 
charts, it is possible to record the geographic 
behaviour of decision-makers and policy-makers. In 
brief, the two concepts can be hypothesized as 
typifying foreign policy planning (geographic mind) 
and the conduct of diplomacy (geographic field) 
(idem).  
At the core of foreign policy-maker’s geographic 
mind are what Henrikson (idem: 512) designated as 
“image-plans”, combining the visual and logical (or 
abstract) elements that inform their “grand 
strategies” and “grand designs”. For its part, the 
geographic field comprehends an activity-generated 
space or “behavior-space”, which results from 
personal experience (idem: 517). To fully understand 
how geographic mental maps influence foreign 
policy-maker’s behaviour, Henrikson argued that 
these two factors must be considered together, for 
large-scale image-plans may help keeping the 
environmental complexity in a comprehensible 
perspective, but “they must be accompanied by keen 
familiarity with smaller behaviour-spaces at ground 
level” (idem: 525).  
Henrikson’s work encouraged additional research 
on geographic mental maps applied to international 
politics. However, theoretical development and 
empirical cases lagged. A decade after Henrikson 
published his essay on mental maps, John 
O´Loughlin and Richard Grant (1990: 507) conceded 
that “to date researchers have not attempted to relate 
cognitive maps and political images”. For their part, 
O´Loughlin and Grant (idem) analysed the post-war 
State of the Union addresses to uncover the mental 
maps of American presidents. According to the 
authors, each speech constituted an illustration of the 
world-views the presidents wanted to describe and 
interpret for the American public. Applying an 
“environmental model”, O´Loughlin and Grant used a 
content analysis method to identify the most 
significant regions for American foreign policy. More 
specifically, the study held “that the amount of 
attention, as measured by the number of speeches, 
paragraphs, words, etc., is an accurate reflection of 
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the concern and importance that leaders in the 
Western world attach to places and events” (idem: 
509).  
Henrikson (2002) took up his previous argument 
once more in Distance and Foreign Policy: A Political 
Geography Approach. He insisted yet again that 
“Geographical ideas, images, and associated 
reasoning processes, which may not be completely 
conscious or fully articulated in speech, do exist in 
the minds of foreign policy makers” (idem; 440-441). 
In particular, cognitively constructed distance is 
important in foreign policy-making. Henrikson 
identifies three types of distances that shape policy-
maker’s comprehension of foreign places and the 
events taking place there – i.e., gravitational distance, 
topological distance, and attributional distance.  
Distancing himself from his critics, Henrikson 
defended that these distance schemes correspond top 
how foreign policy-makers actually think when they 
strategize and plan: 
 
This is “practical geopolitics”, characteristic of the 
reasoning that occurs in foreign policy bureaucracies 
and political institutions, as distinct from what Gearóid 
Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, in their taxonomy term 
“popular geopolitics”, characteristic of the mass media, 
and “formal geopolitics”, characteristic of the academe. 
(Henrikson, 2002: 439-440) 
 
While reinforcing the importance of the influence 
of geographic cognitions on foreign policy, 
Henrikson’s work has had few followers. While some 
studies dedicated to geographic cognition associated 
to international politics have been published in 
recent years (see Bilgin, 2004; Glassman, 2005; 
Latham, 2001; Le Rider, 2008; Scheffler, 2003; Walker, 
2000), most have tended to focus on regional 
perspectives. Other works, while more global in scope 
(see Bialasiewicz et al., 2007; Lewis and Wigen, 1997; 
Sloan, 1988), have not focused directly on the way 
that geographic mental maps inform the decision-
making and policy-making processes
16
, rather 
concentrating on the way geographic constructions 
have justified foreign policy decisions. In a general 
sense, most of these works can be understood within 
a critical geopolitics approach. 
In fact, some of the main epistemological 
propositions stressed by the earlier work on mental 
maps have come under censure from critical 
                                                          
16 In fact, many of these studies do not apply the “mental map” as 
their analytical concept. Many different terms are used to 
characterize the cognitively constructed geographies informing 
foreign policy – e.g., “cognitive geopolitics” (Criekemans, 2009), 
“geopolitical codes” (Dijkink, 1998), “geopolitical images” 
(O’Loughlin and Grant, 1990), “geopolitical imaginary” (Latham, 
2001), “geopolitical imagination” (Agnew, 2003) “imaginative 
geographies” (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007), and “metageographies” 
(Lewis and Wigen, 1997).  
geopolitics. Klaus Dodds (1994) has questioned the 
geographic practice of representing the political 
world, specifically calling on the contributions of 
critical and post-structuralist theories to point out 
that “‘geography’ (or ‘international relations’) as a 
technology or an academic discipline is not simply 
about ‘geographing’ or ‘earth-writing’, i.e., a practice 
whereby geographers simply record the already 
legible surfaces of the earth” (idem: 187). According to 
Dodds, discourses of geographic representations are 
frequently central to the legitimisation of foreign 
policy which fix the boundaries between “Us” and the 
“Others”.  
Critical geopolitics is thus centred on exploring 
how foreign policy professional represent political 
space according to their position in the world. This 
differs from previous research according to Dodds 
(idem: 197) who criticizes Henrikson’s work on 
mental maps for having “little recognition that the 
observer might be implicated within these 
observations or that it might be reasonably 
problematic in assuming one could (re)present the 
activities of others”. Consequently, scholars 
committed to critical geopolitics have developed 
much of the work on geographic representations in 
foreign policy. Relying on discourse analysis and 
similar methods, the central assertion of critical 
geopolitics is “that geography is a social and historical 
discourse which is always bound up with questions of 
politics and ideology” (Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1998: 
79). More specifically: 
 
Fundamental to this process is the power of certain 
national security elites to represent the nature and 
defining dilemmas of international politics in particular 
ways. From a geographical perspective this can be 
described as their power to write international political 
space by constituting, defining and describing security, 
threats and perceived enemies in regularized ways. 
These representational practices of national security 
intellectual generate particular “scripts” in international 
politics concerning places, people and issues. Such 
scripts then become part of the means by which 
hegemony (in the Gramscian sense) is exercised in the 
international system. (Ó Tuathail, 1992: 438). 
 
However, throughout the years, critical geopolitics 
has come to diversify its focus. Especially in its Anglo-
American version, critical geopolitics has broadened 
its research to encapsulate geopolitical practices, 
geopolitical traditions, geopolitics and popular 
culture, and structural geopolitics (Dodds, 2001). In 
fact, the original emancipatory temperament of 
critical theory has vanished from much of the self-
designated critical geopolitics research. The 
multiplication of these studies has led Dalby (2010: 
281) to suggest that “the term critical geopolitics is 
now in danger of proliferating to such an extent that 
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the term simply becomes a synonym for 
contemporary political geography”. 
Accordingly, in recent years, two main avenues of 
research have been followed in the mental map 
research agenda in FPA. The first and prevailing 
approach is representational in nature, i.e., its major 
focus is on the content of foreign policy decision-
makers mental maps. For instance, returning to a 
familiar theme
17
, Henrikson (2008) has examined how 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s (FDR) mental map or 
“geographic-cartographic frame” conditioned US 
policy, namely by moulding popular conceptions of 
world geography. In his study, Alan Henrikson 
explains how FDR’s mental maps justified US foreign 
policy by using a particular global view to transition 
“from geography to ideology”: 
 
For him, the map was an “idea”. In his speeches he set 
out a geospatial framework – a worldwide one – for the 
higher, long-term, even planetary “goals” of the war, far 
beyond its military objectives. (…) Through FDR’s 
rhetoric, his global thinking, on a geographical plane, 
reemerged as universal thinking on an ideological plane. 
His world-picture thus became his, and others’, world-
philosophy. (Henrikson, 2008: 46). 
 
In this sense, Henrikson assumes the subjective 
nature of geographic mental maps. By acknowledging 
the power-laden dimension of mental maps he also 
responds to some of the earlier criticism of his work. 
In a similar vein, Steven Casey and Jonathan Wright 
(2008; 2011) recently edited a collection of essays on 
various world leaders’ post-war mental maps. 
Applying the concept of mental maps as tantamount 
to political worldviews, the authors explore the 
geographic conceptions that influenced the policy-
making of numerous national leaders – e.g., Raymond 
Poincaré, Lloyd George, Mustafa Atatürk, Mao 
Zedong, Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, Edvard 
Benes, Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, etc. 
While constituting the single most extensive 
collection of different foreign policy-maker’s mental 
maps, the studies do not present any theoretical 
framework for applying the mental map approach. 
Besides equating mental maps to worldviews, no 
further attempt to conceptualise mental maps is put 
forward. 
In an apparent response to these theoretical 
shortcomings, a second approach focusing on the 
geographic mental map’s conceptual structure has 
been gaining ground recently. In an effort to 
contextualise mental maps in FPA, David Crieckmans 
and colleagues (Crieckmans, 2009; 2011; Crieckmans 
and Duran, 2011) have evoked the Sprout´s “ecological 
                                                          
17 Henrikson (1975) had previously studied how US geographical 
conceptions had been transformed by a change in the cartographic 
representations during the Second World War period (namely by 
adopting an “Air-Age Globalism” perspective).  
triade” to identify the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions and traits of what he designates as 
“cognitive geopolitics”.  Crieckmans has also 
endeavoured to integrate classical, cognitive, and 
critical geopolitics in order for us to better appreciate 
the complex relationship between the “geo” and the 
“politics”. Indeed, Crieckmans (2011: 8) argues that 
the “road towards a ‘more comprehensive’ 
geopolitical model or framework of analysis could 
therefore be one which entails several aspects of the 
interaction between ‘territoriality’ and ‘politics’”. 
Some research has followed an even more 
conceptually oriented approach. For example, da 
Vinha (2010; 2011a) has focused on analysing the 
concept of the geographic mental map and the way 
that individuals acquire geographic knowledge from 
their political environment. Borrowing from the 
earlier studies in behavioural geography, the author 
has looked to understand how foreign policy-
decision-makers acquire the geographic information 
required for the decision-making process. More 
recently, the research focus has turned to the effect of 
group dynamics on mental maps and how these, 
subsequently, affect decision-makers. By applying 
theoretical assumptions from social psychology, da 
Vinha has expanded on theories of social sharing and 
social cognition to try to appreciate how foreign 
policy decision-making groups construct a common 
understanding of the geographic factors involved in 
international politics: 
 
Rather than focusing on the individual mental maps of 
those involved in the decision-making process we 
should look to the geographic representations created 
by the group. We should try to understand in each 
particular instance how the group – i.e., the decision 
unit – constructs the political world, namely how it 
creates places and spaces and the foreign policies it 
deems most appropriate for interacting with them. (da 





In recent decades, a number of works relating 
geographic mental maps to foreign policy have 
appeared. However, despite the various efforts to 
clarify and explain the conceptual framework 
underlying the geographic mental map research 
agenda, there still persists a good deal of theoretical 
bewilderment. The concept of geographic mental 
map has diverged considerably in its definition and 
numerous methodological approaches have been 
undertaken to clarify it. However, no scholarly 
compromise has yet been established. Mental map is 
still used as a catch-all term with only very vague 
notions of its conceptual underpinnings. 
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Consequently, several issues still need to be 
addressed. First and foremost, the development of a 
theory on how geographic mental maps actually 
influence decision-making and foreign policy-making 
is needed – i.e., the causal affects of geographic 
mental maps on foreign policy. If it has been difficult 
to demonstrate the causation of ideational factors in 
the political world (Yee, 1996), specifying the role of 
geographic ideas has revealed itself even more 
illusive. Enlarging the methodological scope for 
analyzing the mental map’s influence of foreign 
policy is also imperative. While there has been a 
considerable attempt to try to widen the methods 
applied to metal maps in FPA, it will certainly be 
difficult to provide a single satisfactory approach for 
all scholars.  
Even more vital to the mental maps research 
agenda is the lack of a comprehension of the affects 
of changes in mental maps on foreign policy. Despite 
the fact that some researchers have recognized that 
mental maps are dynamic and that the cognition of 
geographic space is in constant flux (Agnew, 1999; 
Gould and White, 1974; Moore and Golledge, 1976; 
Saarinen, 2005), few studies, if any, have focused on 
policy change. Albeit avowing that the “mental-map 
approach to the study of international affairs is well 
suited to this increasingly fluid context” (Henrikson, 
1980a: 505) it has seldom been empirically applied in 
order to comprehend the shifting character of the 
environments within which foreign policy is made. 
For the whole, a review of the scientific literature 
relating to geographic mental maps reveals itself 
complex and sometimes overbearing. The vast 
number of themes comprising the research agenda, 
paralleled by the immense diversification of theories 
and methods, seriously challenges a coherent 
approach to the study of geographic cognition and 
mental maps, particularly in FPA. It suffices to point 
out that Daniel Montello and Scott Freundschuh 
(1995: 170) have acknowledged approximately 200 
combinations resulting from the “lists of terms that 
have been or could be used as labels for knowledge of 
spatial relations in the environment”.  
Ultimately, Downs and Meyer (1978) identified the 
cause for such diversity over a quarter century ago. 
They reminded researchers “there is no ‘right’ way to 
look at the world” (idem: 73). In actual fact, the 
different geographic knowledge generated by the 
various studies are “not in competition for the ‘truth’; 
they are alternative approaches to understanding” 
(idem: 67). Instead of looking at the plethora of 
approaches as a shortcoming, we might begin 
acknowledging it as a constructive way of bringing 
several different fields of inquiry together to further 
our understanding of the place of geography in 
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